Technical risk
Indirect prompt injection
An adversary places malicious instructions in a document or data the agent handles.
- Impact: the agent's guardrails are bypassed, letting a threat actor rewrite your operational procedures.
Whitepaper · Lancaster University & Traversally
Agentic AI systems don't just answer questions — they plan, reason and act. As organisations deploy autonomous agents as "digital employees", they gain speed and scale, but also a new class of cyber risk: goal hijacking. This whitepaper, a collaboration between Lancaster University and Traversally through the CAIRO project, explains the threat and the five governance controls every organisation needs.
A collaboration between Lancaster University and Traversally, produced through the CAIRO project (Cybersecurity Risks of Agentic-AI To Organisations) and supported by the PBIAA CyberFocus project, funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), grant EP/Z536052/1.
Generative AI systems — chatbots such as ChatGPT or Gemini — turn human prompts into desired output. Agentic AI takes this further: AI agents that can plan, reason and act autonomously to achieve a goal. Where generative AI is a support tool for a human, an AI agent can operate like a digital employee, using the context available to it and the tools it can access to pursue objectives with limited or no supervision.
Because agents can act independently and proactively, they offer organisations unparalleled efficiency for complex tasks, operating at a velocity that creates significant potential for return on investment. Naturally, that is a highly attractive paradigm — but trusting a system to act on your behalf does not come without risk.
To deliver impact, an agent needs the freedom to act — and that creates the potential for mistakes if there are not sufficient guardrails or human oversight in place. Imagine an agent deciding that, rather than read a database, it should rewrite it.
A better-documented risk is prompt injection: instructions passed to the agent that cause it to behave in malicious or unexpected ways. For generative AI, prompt injection leads to harmful outputs; for agentic AI, it leads to harmful actions. The problem is compounded because agents proactively ingest data to inform decisions — so a malicious actor doesn't need to touch the agent directly. They can cause harm simply by interfering with the external data an agent uses to make its choices.
"Agents seem different, and they do expand your attack surface, but traditional cybersecurity principles need to apply to your system now more than ever, as often these will lead to the exploits that will matter."
Dr Phininder Balaghan, Co-Founder & CTO, TraversallyThe core threat
Agents work towards a predefined set of goals, often read in from other sources of information — no different to how teams learn of current strategies and priorities. In a goal hijack, those policies are maliciously altered so the agent is no longer working towards its original goal. Faithfully following instructions, the highly efficient digital employee becomes a rogue member of your team — working outside your strategy, or worse, against it.
Technical risk
An adversary places malicious instructions in a document or data the agent handles.
Technical risk
The agent generates actions or code that are carried out without being checked for malice.
Technical risk
The agent can read and write files and APIs when it should be "read-only".
Technical risk
The agent is "tricked" into sending sensitive data to an external recipient.
Anatomy of an attack
01 · Recon
The attacker identifies a data source the agent reads to gain instructions, and crafts a malicious payload — for example a customer profile or policy document — to insert into it.
02 · Delivery
They submit the poisoned data through a "safe" channel — registering a customer profile or contact form, or via a traditional exploit against part of the agentic system.
03 · Exploitation
The agent reads the poisoned data and acts upon it. Its goal has been hijacked.
04 · Impact
An agent now works towards a different, unexpected goal — potentially unbeknown to the organisation, who believe operations are continuing as planned.
"A rogue agent acting against your goals is bad, but it gets worse when you realise that they are representing your organisation and brand and operating contrary to your values."
Professor Nick Race, Lancaster UniversityA rogue agent acting against your goals is bad; it gets worse when that agent represents your organisation and brand and operates contrary to your values. Instead of your agenda, it is now working to someone else's. The risk moves well beyond the financial and operational harm a single hijacked agent can inflict, into reputational damage. This is the worst case: your agent has been hijacked, and so, in turn, has your organisation.
Just because an agent can be fully autonomous does not mean it should be. In traditional cybersecurity, users have their privileges restricted to control their access to systems; for agents this goes further, with both their access and their ability to act restricted. OWASP refers to this as "Constrained Autonomy".
In part this requires a secure-by-design approach to the agentic system, ensuring humans are strategically placed on the loop to provide oversight of the agent's actions. Equally crucial is that these systems are carefully governed — treating agent instructions with the same rigour as legal or financial documents, and ensuring human co-pilots have clear decision-making protocols. Whilst agentic AI offers significant potential, it will not be the organisations with the fastest or most capable agents that gain the most value, but those that do not fall foul of the risks because they have the most securely governed systems.
The playbook
01
Restrict agents to only the data, systems and actions required to perform their role.
02
Introduce approval checkpoints for high-impact decisions and autonomous actions.
03
Treat agent instructions and policies as controlled assets with formal governance and change management.
04
Monitor agent behaviour, tool usage and outputs to quickly identify abnormal activity.
05
Avoid giving a single agent end-to-end authority over critical processes and transactions.
"Just because an organisation can use agentic AI to automate their operations, it does not mean that they should — without carefully considering how this fundamentally changes their cybersecurity posture."
Dr Edward Austin, Lancaster UniversityFAQ
Goal hijacking is when an attacker maliciously alters the policies or data an AI agent reads to set its objectives, so the agent stops working towards its intended goal and instead pursues the attacker's — often without the underlying AI model being touched at all.
Indirect prompt injection is where an adversary hides malicious instructions inside a document, dataset, customer profile or contact form that an agent ingests. The agent reads the poisoned content and acts on it, bypassing its guardrails — without the attacker ever accessing the agent directly.
With generative AI (chatbots), prompt injection leads to harmful outputs. With agentic AI, the same manipulation can lead to harmful actions — because agents can use tools, call systems and make decisions autonomously. A compromised agent can act as an insider threat from inside your firewall.
Constrained autonomy — a principle referenced by OWASP — means restricting both an agent's access and its ability to act, rather than letting it operate with full autonomy just because it can. It is achieved through secure-by-design systems, humans on the loop, and strong governance of agent instructions.
(1) Principle of least privilege, (2) human-in-the-loop oversight, (3) policy management controls, (4) continuous monitoring, and (5) segregation of agent duties. Together they keep autonomous agents safe, accountable and governable.
It is a collaboration between Lancaster University and Traversally, produced through the CAIRO project (Cybersecurity Risks of Agentic-AI To Organisations). The authors are Professor Nick Race and Dr Edward Austin (Lancaster University), and Ian Makin and Dr Phininder Balaghan (Traversally). The work was supported by the PBIAA CyberFocus project, funded by the EPSRC.
Credits
Lancaster University
Professor of Networked Systems and Director of Lancaster's Academic Centre of Excellence for Cybersecurity Research. Principal investigator for the CAIRO project.
Lancaster University
Research fellow at Lancaster University with significant experience in data-driven cybersecurity and the safe, secure use of AI systems. Research lead for the CAIRO project.
Traversally
Data strategist and two-time tech founder. Over a 25-year career he has co-founded and scaled specialist data and AI governance consultancies, delivering secure-by-design solutions trusted by enterprise C-suites.
Traversally
Co-Founder and CTO of Traversally, formerly Global Head of AI for QinetiQ (FTSE 250) and a lead AI consultant for PA Consulting. He has advised UK government departments on AI strategy, governance and assurance.
Traversally provides the governance, leadership and assurance required to turn AI ambition into measurable business value — reducing risk, accelerating adoption, and ensuring AI investments deliver measurable ROI.
Lancaster University is a top-10 UK university and home to world-leading experts in AI and cyber, recognised as an Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research.
This whitepaper was supported by the PBIAA CyberFocus project, funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), grant EP/Z536052/1. © 2026 Lancaster University and Traversally.
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